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Anne Barlow 
 
Abstract 
Whereas solidarity was the backbone of both family life and (patriarchal) family law, autonomy (and 
equality) are arguably becoming the concepts of reform within modern family law.  Yet whilst 
autonomy is an alluring concept and one which is difficult to argue against from an individual 
perspective, this article challenges its suitability as a driving principle of family regulation.  It is 
suggested that the players within family life (in all styles of relationship) have not and perhaps 
cannot be assumed to achieve sufficient substantive equality for autonomy to rule the private family 
sphere, where structural issues and gendered social norms within wider society expose some family 
members more than others to relationship-generated disadvantage.  Rather, this paper argues that 
we need to address the mixed messages being sent by recognising the need for interdependence 
within family life and the obstacles to substantive equality and autonomy in this frame.  This is best 
done by promoting the positive notion of family solidarity as the centre-piece of family law, rather 
than autonomy, which, it is suggested, would avoid falling prey to the negative association with 
victimhood that has been experienced by notions of dependency and vulnerability in these debates.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Adult couple relationships are increasingly characterised as equal partnerships where the partners 
should be at liberty to jointly exercise their autonomy around decision–making on family issues.  We 
see this developing explicitly and implicitly in England and Wales in a range of areas where family 
law’s protective role would once have expected to govern regulatory principles.  Recent examples of 
this phenomenon include: - recognition of enforceable pre-nuptial agreements;1 replacement of 
statutory child support obligations with parent-negotiated child maintenance;2 strong regulatory 
encouragement of family mediation;3 and rejection of calls for family law regulation of cohabitant 
separation.4  This line of liberal thinking based on assumptions of equality and autonomy is replacing 
(quite understandably on one level) old family law protections which aimed to redress dependency 
and vulnerability. 
However, the suitability of these liberal concepts (at least in their pure form) to family regulation is 
open to question.  Family life is not just about the interests of a collection of autonomous 
individuals.  Intrinsically it is something more than the sum of its individual parts.  It involves a joint 
enterprise, centred around an ethos of what might be termed ‘solidarity’.  Family solidarity5 has 
been the cornerstone of the family law of our European neighbours and fundamental to the 
principles underpinning community of property regimes.  It is suggested here that it is a concept 
which still captures and embodies the collective nature of the enterprise of family life. In social 
terms, it can perhaps be seen as the invisible glue which holds family life together and is important 
not only to the functioning of families themselves, but also to wider society which depends on the 
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care and support which families provide as part of the bond which solidarity creates.  In its original 
guise, the idea of family solidarity suited patriarchal thinking.  Such solidarity went hand in hand with 
the traditional gender contract within married families where protective values of paternalism and 
duties of sacrifice were dominant.  It fitted well with a gendered separation of the roles around 
breadwinning and caregiving for the benefit of the collective family enterprise which was accepted 
and embedded within social and legal norms.6 Yet the norms surrounding this traditional model of 
family life have been challenged and the nature of family solidarity has adapted over time to reach 
out to new forms of family, including same-sex spouses and civil partners who aspired to it.  The 
term ‘family solidarity’ is therefore used in this article as an evolving concept which encapsulates the 
joint enterprise, mutual support and obligations which modern family life (in all its different forms) 
encompasses from a moral and economic perspective and which is often reflected and reinforced in 
legal regulation.  It stands in contrast to individualistic notions of autonomy and recognises the 
altruism which is often required to fulfil its demands. 
Yet some might argue that such a concept is no longer needed in an age of equality.  This line of 
thinking fits well with the developing autonomy discourse within which contract can replace the role 
of family law.  If the traditional notion of solidarity around breadwinning and caregiving is obsolete, 
then it is arguably unnecessary for family law to regulate families in a particular way.  To do so can 
be seen as protective and paternalistic.  The basis for this is that couples (whether married or 
unmarried, same- or different-sex, intact or separated) are now in the 21st century equal partners 
and therefore equally autonomous and free to negotiate their respective roles and financial position 
within their couple relationships and wider family.  But this, it is suggested, can only hold true if we 
have actually become a society of substantively equal individuals within a family life which no longer 
needs the supporting solidarity of the institution of family.   
Drawing on recent data on employment and caregiving practices, this article will argue that we have 
not yet achieved that state and indeed, should question whether it is one that should be regarded as 
an ideal.  It will suggest that to continue to move towards autonomy and formal equality is to 
misunderstand something fundamental about the nature of family life and what distinguishes it from 
the relationships between unconnected individuals in civil society.  It takes the view that there 
remains an important role for family law to play in regulating family life beyond any bilateral 
contract between partners and that this should involve placing a positive, modernised 
reconceptualisation of family solidarity as a norm at the heart of family law. 
THE ALLURE OF AUTONOMY AND EQUALITY 
Autonomy and equality are on the face of it very attractive principles which people endorse and 
which are very hard to argue against.  Why would anyone not want to think that they were 
autonomous and equal members of society?  Yet, given the dominance of different norms and 
values which in practice operate within the private sphere of the family, it is important to question 
how universally appropriate these public sphere principles are to the regulation of family life.  Here 
quite different idealised values of love, care, emotional and financial support, altruism and collective 
enterprise are embedded and are vital to and have an influence on its functioning and decision-
making.  These can be seen to serve not only the collective family good but also the wider interests 
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of society as a whole which depends on the family in many ways and not least to undertake the 
business of bringing up the next generation, as well as increasingly to provide support to the older 
generation.  These values are by their nature antithetical to free, autonomous, individual action and 
decision-making by individual family members acting in their own selfish interests.  This is one 
reason why the state has traditionally regulated marriage as a legal status which confers rights and 
obligations rather than as a simple bilateral contract.  However, the traditional approach to 
regulating family solidarity is in a process of change which goes hand in hand with the ongoing, if as 
yet incomplete, renegotiation of the gender contract.  If principles of equality and autonomy 
dominate family law thinking, it can be reasoned that as couple relationships comprise two equal 
partners, there is no reason why the law should not allow them to exercise their autonomy in 
decision-making around family issues within intact and post-separation families.  But surely this begs 
the question of what equality and autonomy look like in the family sphere today, where these 
concepts are not straightforward and, it is suggested, might often be illusory rather than real.  Whilst 
there is usually formal equality between partners, can there be substantive equality between 
members of a couple (whether intact or separated) if structural factors and gendered social norms 
do still influence couple behaviours?  Similarly, how much individual autonomy is there for a partner 
in a decision which is made jointly by a couple for the benefit of the family as a whole, but which has 
long term adverse financial repercussions for just that one partner?   
Leaving aside for now the answers to these questions, as noted above, recent developments reveal 
private family law principles are increasingly taking a pro-autonomy stance with a proportionately 
diminishing protective role. The clearest example of the shift towards couple autonomy in family 
law-thinking is the recent endorsement by the majority of the Supreme Court of enforceable pre-
nuptial agreements in Radmacher v Granatino7 which for the first time confirmed that spouses in 
England and Wales may contract out of statutory financial provision on divorce.  The reasoning in 
favour of this new approach was clearly couched in the language of autonomy and concerns about 
the reality of family decision-making when entering a pre-nuptial agreement were swept aside.  In 
contrast to the dissenting judgment of Lady Hale, who recognised that ‘choices are often made for 
the overall happiness of the family’8 and pointed out that the reality of the autonomy of people who 
are about to marry to make considered, rational choices may be open to question,9 Lord Wilson 
wholeheartedly embraced the autonomy discourse in the leading judgment: 
‘The reason why the court should give weight to a nuptial agreement is that there should be 
respect for individual autonomy…It would be paternalistic and patronising to override their 
agreement simply on the basis that the court knows best.’10 
Yet, this is to assume that each party to a pre-nuptial agreement holds equal power and autonomy 
over the process and will continue to do so throughout the marriage, thus not needing family law 
protection, which is often not the case.  Even if power is equally held at the point of the marriage, 
how possible is it to act in accordance with one’s own interests under the agreement (e.g. not to 
give up work to preserve one’s earning capacity), in the face of competing needs to act in the wider 
                                                          
7
 [2010] UKSC 42. 
88
 Ibid at [188]. 
9
 Ibid at [135]. 
10
 Ibid at [78]. 
 5 
family interests (e.g. to move abroad with your children to enable you to live together as a family 
while your spouse pursues their own advantageous career opportunity)? 
However, the appeal of the autonomy discourse even in the family law sphere is difficult to deny. As 
Alison Diduck has pointed out, ‘Autonomy is in many ways the friendly face of individual 
responsibility.’11 The change in rhetoric away from individualism towards autonomy has cleverly 
removed the association of individualism with the negativity of selfishness and coupled it with the 
positive discourses of freedom, choice and equality.  This positive if superficial shift has also enabled 
other challenges to the autonomy discourse (mainly found in the feminist literature) to be seen as 
negative reactions which are then more easily dismissed, as discussed below.  The allure of 
autonomy principles facilitates the neat sidestepping of questions as to why in some situations 
autonomy and formal equality are not appropriate principles for family regulation, effectively 
marginalising such issues in mainstream debate.  Thus to go back to some of the examples of the 
move towards championing autonomy in family law set out above, whilst parental agreement 
around child maintenance on separation is to be encouraged, to remove the parent with care’s free 
access to the statutory mechanism of calculation and enforcement of payment of the appropriate 
sums, is to misunderstand the substantive inequality in power between the payer and payee.  
Similarly, to assume the strongly encouraged autonomy for those on legal aid to agree children (and 
financial) matters only through mediation will result in appropriate agreements in high conflict 
cases, is to abdicate law’s responsibility to safeguard the best interests of the children.  Yet the 
greater allure of principles of autonomy in an era of formal partner equality and economic austerity 
has now been conveniently used to trump any seen need to provide meaningful access to private 
family law protection.  
RISING ABOVE AUTONOMY AND FORMAL EQUALITY – AN IMPOSSIBLE CHALLENGE? 
A number of attempts have been made to challenge the dominant liberal discourses around (male) 
conceptions of autonomy and formal equality in and beyond the family law sphere within different 
bodies of feminist literature.  Gilligan’s moral theory of the ‘ethics of care’ was put forward as an 
alternative female platform of thinking with care at its centre and has been used to challenge the 
male voice within traditional notions of justice.12 Similarly arguments pointing out the need to 
appreciate the critical distinction between formal and substantive equality13 before a gender-free 
level playing field is created are well rehearsed and are particularly pertinent to the family law 
sphere, as discussed below.  A distinction has also been drawn between individual and relational 
autonomy,14 where only the latter recognises the impossibility of autonomy within family life and 
builds on the ethics of care discourse to put forward a notion of relational autonomy which 
recognises the interdependency and vulnerability of both children and adults who will always act in 
relation to each other.  These have been joined by attempts by Fineman to recast her notion of 
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family dependency15 within the universality of the broader concept of ‘vulnerability’ to which we are 
all subject in many areas of life (e.g. global financial crises; environmental disasters) and which, she 
argues, the responsive state should acknowledge (and preferably respond to) by replacing the focus 
in law on the autonomous liberal legal subject with the vulnerable legal subject. 16  
Yet whilst all of these feminist arguments are well made and should carry great force, it is suggested 
that they have inadvertently cast themselves in a negative light and thus are too easily dismissed.  As 
Brown has argued, vulnerability has been ‘remoralised’ in a way which strips it of its power: 
‘On first impressions, ‘vulnerability’ seems linked to a therapeutic and well-meaning approach to 
helping those ‘less well off’ in society. A more critical examination of the operationalisation of the 
concept suggests that although focusing on ‘the vulnerable’ is helpful for some people some of the 
time, this policy also has less benevolent effects related to bureaucratic condescension, selective 
systems of welfare, paternalism and social control.‘ 17 
Later, she insightfully concludes,  
‘A focus on ‘vulnerability’ gives tacit emphasis to the individual factors which contribute to difficult 
circumstances, rather than the structural forces which may have influenced life chances and 
situations.’ 18 
Thus, the exposition of ‘dependency’ and ‘vulnerability’ as experienced in the family sphere do 
undoubtedly challenge the male-dominated vision of autonomy and formal equality as the most 
appropriate regulatory norms.  Yet their construction in opposition to the dominant liberal discourse 
in law can be seen to take on the mantle of ‘female victim’, at a time when a ‘male’ version of 
autonomy has gained credibility as the more appropriate legal principle.  The dominance and 
acceptability of such ‘male’ thinking is undoubtedly reinforced by a (false) widely held belief in 
realised gender equality. Together, it is argued here, autonomy and formal equality combine 
effectively to become the acceptable and attractive face of individualism, which reduces the visibility 
of a lack of substantive equality and which enables the concept of vulnerability, like dependency 
before it, to be easily cast as an unfortunate, avoidable state. Vulnerability then immediately takes 
on negative attributes for which exceptions to normal rules may have to be made and which may, 
therefore, quite legitimately from this perspective come at a price.  As Diduck explains,  
‘Just as dependence excluded one from the class of the responsible, vulnerability seems in 
the new rhetoric to preclude one from being classed as autonomous.’19  
This negative imagery of and negative response to dependence and vulnerability in social policy and 
law can be seen to avoid the need for the state to address the underlying problems both of 
substantive gender equality within and beyond heterosexual relationships and of the real lack of 
meaningful autonomy in the family situation.  For where there are legal and practical caring 
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responsibilities, they, in reality, make it impossible to be truly autonomous – financially or as a 
matter of personal liberty.  Such an approach also sidesteps the consequences of devolved ‘family 
responsibility’ (where the state does not provide affordable, high quality childcare or eldercare), and 
the social norms which feed into the decision-making around who undertakes which roles within 
family life.  Such norms might be termed the obligations of ‘family solidarity’, which require personal 
sacrifice for the greater good of the family.  These social norms and feelings of moral obligation (e.g. 
the perceived desirability of one parent being available to collect young children from school rather 
than pursue a full-time career), pull against free choice and the autonomy to act in your own 
individual interests.  Whilst on the one hand, these norms are willingly accepted and indeed 
embraced by family members who believe it is right to decide to put the collective good before their 
individual interests, their subtle influence on family decision-making, still risks creating differential 
and often gendered ‘relationship-generated disadvantage’,20 the effect of which may only be fully 
realised later, such as at the point of relationship breakdown. 
It will therefore be argued here that a positive concept of a modernised family solidarity which 
recognises the benefits of such solidarity for both the family (men, women, children and other 
‘dependents’) and wider society is needed as the new centrepiece of family law. This endorsement 
of the necessity and collective benefits of interdependence will aim to replace the false friends of 
autonomy and formal equality as the dominant discourse within family law and avoid the concept 
being cast negatively in the role of the vulnerable female victim.  It will also address the mixed 
messages around autonomy, equality and expected family practices currently being sent by family 
law and policy. 
SOCIAL AND LEGAL NORMS, EQUALITY AND FAMILY SOLIDARITY – UNPACKING THE MIXED 
MESSAGES 
Probably because as a society we are still in the throes of renegotiating the gender contract around 
the roles to be played by men and women, mothers and fathers within family life, as things stand, 
there are definitely mixed messages being sent by family law.  Whilst it has embraced the (formal) 
equality and autonomy discourses for use in private family law, at the same time it also endorses the 
public mores and social norm notions of family obligations.  As we have seen, certain values are 
embedded within idealised intact family life around love, care and altruism.  This holds true in 
general but has particular resonance around good parenting which still today requires a selfless 
devotion to the family cause.  These social norm notions of family obligation will inevitably clash 
with the exercise of individual autonomy and will also often be unequally shared along gendered 
lines.  So a new approach which applauds and recognises the benefits and risks of engaging in the 
joint enterprise of family solidarity should be constructed to embody notions of the equal value of 
different family roles and recognise the limits these (for good cause) place on the exercise of 
individual autonomy.  Let us first consider the origins of the concept of family solidarity before 
examining the gendered structural and social norm constraints placed on achieving substantive 
gender equality within the family sphere. 
Origins of family solidarity 
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The concept of ‘solidarity’ in family law is most commonly found in the Civil Codes of the 
jurisdictions of our European neighbours.  The French PaCS (Pacte Civil de Solidarite or Civil 
Solidarity Agreement) in which same and different-sex cohabiting couples can make and then 
register an agreement on how to share their property on separation and which also then attracts a 
formal legal status and certain marriage-like rights in French law, is perhaps the best known example 
of its recent use to a British audience.21 As indicated above, the idea of solidarity in the family law 
context encapsulates the mutual support and obligations which family life encompasses from a 
moral and economic perspective but which is often reflected and reinforced in legal regulation.  It 
can be seen as the often unspoken loose rules of expected behaviours which are embedded as social 
norms around the joint enterprise of family life.  These combine to form an invisible but societally 
understood glue which holds family life together and which demarcates the expected behaviours of 
those in a family relationship from those of unconnected individuals.  Its legal embodiment can be 
seen in the traditional community of property regimes (immediate community of acquests on 
marriage) under which family gains and losses acquired during a marriage are shared equally and 
through which different gendered contributions of breadwinning and homemaking are ostensibly 
recognised as being of equal value.22  This approach has been challenged and adapted over time, 
resulting in the ability to opt into a separate property regime and the rising popularity of deferred 
community of property, which preserves separate property during marriage, with a community of 
property arising only on separation in many jurisdictions.23  Some will argue that it is therefore time 
to reject such pooling and redistribution of family assets and collective responsibilities as the 
mainstay of family life and family law on the basis that couples (whether married or unmarried, 
same- or different-sex, intact or separated) are in the 21st century now equal and therefore 
autonomous, leaving them free agents to negotiate their roles and asset division within their 
relationship and wider family.  But as set out below, we have yet to become a society of 
substantively equal individuals which no longer needs the supporting solidarity of the institution of 
family and this will remain the case whilst caregiving work is largely devolved to the private family 
with economic consequences for primary carers and homemakers. 
Family law does not deny its patriarchal history and should aim to reflect the changing norms 
surrounding the gender contract and family practices over time.  We have certainly made progress 
since Lord Denning’s clear normative assertions around what the gendered roles and legal 
expectations were in marriage in the 1970s.  In Wachtel v Wachtel,24 he used these to justify an 
order awarding a husband two thirds of the assets on divorce, and the wife just one third: 
‘The husband will have to go out to work all day and must get some woman to look after the 
house – either a wife, if he remarries, or a housekeeper, if he does not.  The wife will not usually 
have so much expense.  She may go out to work herself, but she will not usually employ a 
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housekeeper.  She will do most of the housework herself, perhaps with some help.  Or she may 
remarry, in which case her new husband will provide for her.’25 
This seems to the 21st century audience quite shockingly stereotypical, echoing gender norms from a 
bygone age.  Yet recent research on who does the housework within families makes clear this is still 
in practice very much women’s work. In the nationally representative British Social Attitudes Survey 
(BSA Survey) in 2006, women still did all or most of the laundry in 77 per cent of households and 
undertook all or most of the cleaning and meal preparation in around 60 per cent, although 
shopping and caring for sick family members were more equally shared.26  Men’s low levels of 
participation in such household tasks persist despite women’s far greater engagement with the 
labour market.  Indeed, a woman’s part-time working (in contrast to full-time working) does not 
significantly affect how such tasks are shared within the household.27  When these questions were 
repeated in the 2012 BSA Survey, no significant changes in these domestic behaviours were found.  
As the editors remark in their introduction,  
‘[A]ctual behaviour at home has not caught up with changing attitudes. Women still report 
undertaking a disproportionate amount of housework and caring activities, spending an 
average of 13 hours on housework and 23 hours caring for family members each week, 
compared with eight and 10 hours respectively for men.’28 
Structural obstacles to equality and autonomy? 
Who undertakes these roles is clearly linked to pay, cost of childcare/domestic help and partner 
employment options.  Yet where research by the Family and Childcare Trust shows that part-time 
childcare costs for a family of two children are 4.7 per cent higher than the average UK mortgage bill 
for the family home29, it is unsurprising that for lower-middle income households at least, it often 
makes financial sense for one partner to undertake the childcare, if only on a part-time basis.  
Indeed, the Trust’s subsequent 2015 survey reports childcare costs have risen 33 per cent since 
2010, much higher than inflation, and that according to OECD figures, childcare costs in the UK 
(alongside Ireland) are now the highest in Europe, making them so expensive that families are 
increasingly better off if one partner gives up work to look after their offspring.30 However, longer 
term, whichever partner reduces their paid work to undertake childcare or other domestic work is 
likely to reduce their own labour market value over time.  This matters little in the intact family, but 
potentially exposes the weaker economic partner to poverty at the end of the relationship unless 
family law steps in to mitigate. Following an autonomy discourse, the logical consequence is that as 
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both partners have freely chosen their roles, each should bear the consequences of that choice.  
Certainly in the cohabitation context, this is the approach the law of England and Wales takes, 
although in the absence of a valid pre-nuptial agreement agreeing otherwise, compensation for 
‘relationship generated disadvantage’ and a principle of equal sharing of matrimonial assets is 
recognised where assets are available on divorce.31  But are these free choices that partners make, 
or is the situation more complex?  Let us now consider what influences choices around childcare in 
the equal partnership model of modern family life and what the implications are for family solidarity. 
Ideally in an equal relationship, both partners may wish to share childcare or the costs of childcare 
equally.  Yet two part-time jobs or the cost of full-time childcare for two or more children will most 
often make family finances unsustainable.  In the absence of ‘free’ childcare by a relative (and 27 per 
cent of UK families use grandparents as carers32), a choice then has to be made around who should 
give up work or work part-time to facilitate the childcare.  There are various factors likely to 
influence this decision, both financial and non-financial.  One powerful factor will undoubtedly be 
which partner is the highest earner, as the family as a whole are likely to want to maximise their 
income.  This is where structural issues beyond the individual family’s control come into play but are 
seen as matters of free choice, in line with the autonomy discourse, rather than constrained choice.  
The continued existence of the so-called gender pay gap is confirmed annually in surveys.  However, 
the gap can be measured in various ways.  If you take the median hourly pay rate, excluding 
overtime, as used by ONS, the news is good as the gender pay gap is narrowing.  In 2014 this 
reduced to 9.4 per cent compared with 10 per cent in 2013 and confirms an overall downward 
trend, from 17.4 per cent in 1997.33 So per hour, women earn around 90p compared to a man’s £1.  
However, this does not tell the whole story.  Research drawing on ONS earnings’ data for the 
Halifax's annual examination of the behaviour and experiences of men and women in the labour 
market shows that in 2012, men in full-time employment were actually paid on average one third 
more than women in full-time employment, where average male earnings were £36,156 compared 
to average female earnings of £27,291.34  The same survey confirms that 67 per cent of women are 
in employment compared to 77 per cent of men, but that 37 per cent of women work part-time 
compared with just 10 per cent of men.  Thus among working age women, we find that their 
employment behaviour is quite different to that of men’s and on closer examination, these different 
patterns polarise most during the years a family has young children.  Unsurprisingly, in 2013 women 
up to the age of 49 with children had lower employment rates than those without children. Yet for 
                                                          
31
 Cohabitants have no right to claim maintenance from their partner on relationship breakdown.  They may 
claim financial provision for the benefit of the child under Schedule 1 Children Act 1989 from the other parent, 
but there is no compensation element for relationship generated disadvantage nor a principle of fairness, in 
contrast to the divorce context, following the decisions in White v White [1999] and Miller v Miller; McFarlane 
v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 where fairness involves acknowledging the equal value of financial and non-
financial contributions and is achieved by meeting needs, sharing assets and compensating for relationship 
generated disadvantage. 
32
 J Rutter, Annual Childcare Costs Survey, (Family and Childcare Trust ,2015), available online at 
http://www.fct.bigmallet.co.uk/sites/default/files/files/Childcare_cost_survey_2015_Final.pdf#overlay-
context=annual-childcare-costs-surveys. 
33
 ONS, Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) 2014 Provisional Results, (Office for National Statistics, 
2014), available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_385428.pdf . 
34
 Halifax PLC, Men v Women: The economic and financial divide 2013 available at - 
http://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/globalassets/documents/media/press-
releases/halifax/2013/1903_menvwomen.pdf . Note that this measure reveals what men and women do actually 
earn and would include factors such as overtime payments worked for and received, not included in the hourly 
earnings rate. 
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men the opposite was true, as men with children were more likely to work than those without.35  
Indeed, in the 25-34 age range, only 63 per cent of women with children work, as compared with 89 
per cent of men with children and 86 per cent of women without children in the same age group. 
Thus women as a group earn less than men, added to which caring for children would seem to have 
a direct and gendered link to the employment behaviours of men and women, where women are 
likely to loosen their ties with the labour market whilst men tend to strengthen theirs, showing that 
the gender stereotypical roles within families have not disappeared.  
Whilst financial calculations are clearly a factor in the choices made, it seems unlikely that this is the 
sole reason why women rather than men take on the lion’s share of the childcare and domestic 
roles.  Let us consider how such lingering gender stereotypical behaviour might relate to prevailing 
social norms around parenting behaviours.  What behaviour by women do we associate with ‘being 
a good mother’?  Not, it is suggested, how much they earn or how successful a career they have 
maintained.  This may be regarded as admirable in other ways – succeeding in ‘having it all’ and 
perhaps providing a good role-model for daughters in particular – but it probably does not enhance 
their quality of mothering in the eyes of society.  This is still linked to how well children are cared for, 
where research confirms the ideology of motherhood remains rooted in care-giving.36  Thus parents, 
but mothers in particular, are judged on whether children get to school on time; how well behaved 
children are; how well-presented they are; how happy they are; how they are cared for when they 
are sick and in general. Childcare is still a female dominated activity and remains so in the mind of 
the public.  In the BSA survey 2012 where respondents were asked to pick a range of family work 
and childcare options, only nine per cent of people chose options that did not involve the mother 
being ascribed the sole or main carer role.37 Even when both parents work full-time, who would you 
guess schools typically call first when a child is ill?  
In contrast, consider how we judge ‘a good father’. Whilst the BSA Survey 2012 confirms that only 13 
per cent of the British public supported a gendered separation of roles with the man as a sole 
breadwinner,38 as a society, perhaps we still see men’s primary role as that of breadwinner, with 
more sharing of the caring now expected as an ‘add-on’, as icing on the cake? A father’s public 
sphere role is always acknowledged as important to the family and there is little or no pressure to 
give up work or work part-time when children come along.  Yet is this as true for mothers?  Even if 
we do not articulate it overtly, not wanting to undermine arguments around equality, we still, as a 
society, expect mothers, more often than fathers, to control the private sphere of family life. 
Mothers, not fathers, in most cases are still principally charged by society with family organisation, 
with pulling the strings which make everyone’s lives move smoothly, bearing what the French call 
the charge mentale (mental load) of this work even when they are in full-time paid work.  Given this, 
perhaps women themselves still think they ought to be doing this to be a good mother, whereas 
men still see their primary role as breadwinners.  Research would seem to support this influence of 
                                                          
35
 ONS, Full report - Women in the labour market (ONS, 2013) available at 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_328352.pdf pp 8-9. 
36
 T Arendell, ‘Conceiving and investigating motherhood: the decade’s scholarship’, 62(4) Journal of Marriage 
and the Family 1192, (2000). 
37
 A Park, C Bryson, E Clery, J Curtice, and M Phillips, (eds.), British Social Attitudes: the 30th Report, 
(NatCen Social Research, 2013), available at http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/latest-report/british-social-attitudes-
30/gender-roles/attitudes-to-gender-roles-change-over-time.aspx . 
38
 Ibid. 
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gendered social norms in employment decision-making.  Forty per cent of respondents to the BSA 
2012, selected the part-time working mother plus full-time working father as their preferred model 
for family life, with less than one per cent supporting role reversal and only four per cent supporting 
both parents working full-time.  This is a strong reflection of how the operation of social norms in 
wider society may affect decision-making by families.  Duncan and Edwards’39 study of lone parent 
employment choices has described this influence on decision-making as ‘gendered moral 
rationalities’, whereby choices are shaped according to what social norms dictate as ‘good 
mothering’ rather than purely financial considerations, and these may vary between different socio-
economic classes and ethnic communities. Even though partners do now both perform some of each 
of the breadwinning and caregiving roles, in general they are still not evenly distributed.  In the 
Netherlands, where the employment patterns as in the UK show fathers working full-time with 
women predominantly working part-time following childbirth, research has looked at how the Dutch 
ideology of motherhood has changed.  Whereas intensive mothering, in which mothers (rather than 
fathers) should spend large amounts of time, physical and emotional energy and money (earned by 
fathers) raising children was the dominant view, 40 this has now shifted towards a less traditional 
motherhood ideology, in which women are expected to work part-time, yet they are also expected 
to mother intensively when at home.41  This therefore shows that there is a gendered differential 
effect linked to social norms around these choices.  As the 2012 BSA Survey editors state,  
‘It seems that while attitudes that there should be a clear gender divide - with male 
breadwinners and female home-keepers - have been almost eradicated (believed by only 
one in eight people in 2012), when children are involved, substantial minorities of the public 
still believe that women would prefer to, and indeed should, stay at home rather than take 
on paid work.’42 
TIME FOR A NEW RHETORIC? 
This is the landscape in which the renegotiation of the gender contract is ongoing and negotiations 
are nowhere near finished.  If the provision of high quality affordable childcare and eldercare were 
the preserve of the State rather than the family as they are in Scandinavia, then the move towards 
substantive equality and individual autonomy within the family sphere might be our direction of 
travel.  We have seen some recent reforms such as the introduction on the 5th April 2015 of the 
ability to share parental leave more equally.43 The General Election in 2015 did also see far greater 
engagement by political parties around the issue of childcare, yet demand outstrips supply in the UK.  
It is also very expensive, although the Childcare Bill announced in the Queen’s speech promises 30 
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 S Duncan and R Edwards, Lone Mothers, Paid Work and Gendered Moral Rationalities, (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1999). 
40
 G Beets, A Liefbroer and J De Jong Gierveld, ‘Combining employment and parenthood: a longitudinal study 
of intentions of Dutch young adults’, 16(5) Population Research and Policy Review 457–74, (1997). 
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 Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (The Netherlands Institute for Social Research), Emancipation Monitor, 
(SCP, 2008). 
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hours free childcare per week for 3 and 4 year olds.44  Furthermore, as we have seen, the British 
Social Attitudes Survey 2012 shows that people still believe that the part-time working mother with 
a full-time working father should be the parenting model of choice for families with children.  Thus if 
there is to be little inroad into the structural and social norm factors which affect the employment 
and caregiving choices of partners and with no large-scale infrastructure investment into nursery 
and afterschool provision on the horizon, unless family law steps in to value and respect the style of 
family solidarity which families choose, the gender inequalities on relationship breakdown will 
prevail and become more entrenched behind the veneer of the growing autonomy discourse.  It is 
true that in the married context, this is exactly what family law already does.  As Lord Nicholls 
recognised in expounding what fairness should mean where gendered roles have been adopted,  
‘If, in their different spheres, each contributed equally to the family, then in principle it matters not 
which of them earned the money and built up the assets. There should be no bias in favour of the 
money-earner and against the home-maker and the child-carer.’45  
Indeed, this non-discrimination principle between breadwinner and homemaker has also been 
confirmed as extending to same-sex civil partnerships in Lawrence v Gallagher46 (and presumably 
now to same-sex marriage), despite the lack of gender disparities in that context. This recognises 
that family solidarity extends beyond the heterosexual context to newer family forms and is not 
necessarily gendered, where different roles are adopted for the benefit of the family.  However, the 
fact that the assumption of these roles and consequent differential impact on the partner’s financial 
position on relationship breakdown is not yet recognised as extending to cohabiting couples in 
England and Wales is something which needs to be addressed, although within the UK some account 
is at least taken of economic disadvantage incurred in such relationships in Scots Law.47  Pre-nuptial 
agreements can also mean that the economic disparity generated by a marriage can be ignored, and 
the couple’s autonomy to enter such an agreement will trump the non-discrimination approach to 
fairness at the point of divorce, where the agreement itself is adjudged to have been fairly entered 
into at the outset of the marriage and is not proved to be unfair at the time of divorce.48 
Rather, a reframing of the concept of family solidarity is needed, which moves away from 
paternalism and sacrifice but positively values interdependence rather than individual autonomy 
and explicitly recognises as equal the different contributions and sacrifices which the joint enterprise 
of family life, in all its 21st century guises, entails.  This recognition of solidarity would act to bridge 
the gulf, where appropriate, between the differential and often gendered consequences of the 
enterprise of family life experienced by partners, particularly where relationships break down. The 
rationale for this is therefore a positive recognition of contribution to family life and the needs of 
wider society rather than ‘charitable’ compensation for an unfortunate, economically vulnerable 
victim.  
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CONCLUSION 
It is suggested that in any event it cannot be appropriate for family law to assume an equality and 
autonomy discourse, which permits it to disregard the positive work around caring for children and 
the elderly, which families do and are expected to do for each other and for society.  Whilst we 
should not ignore the structural inequalities and continue to press for change, we should at this 
moment in time promote the importance of solidarity in all styles of family relationship and 
acknowledge the sacrifices in and around the family business of caring to enhance its normative 
value in social and legal terms.  We need to rebut the mixed messages which deny the cost to one’s 
autonomy of being a good parent and instead trumpet its underlying importance and value to 
society.   
We should, of course, continue to look hard at what role we want family law to perform in 
regulating family life around caregiving in both pre- and post-separation families and in providing for 
a plurality of responses to non-traditional family forms.  This is not a fixed state of affairs but one 
which needs to respond to social change and changing social norms, but only when change becomes 
a reality rather than an ideal. We cannot ignore the fact that social expectations around caregiving 
and breadwinning roles are often still gendered in the British context, even where both parents 
work. Change will happen over time but, there should be clear and positive legal recognition that the 
caregiving roles commonly undertaken within families are as equally valuable as ‘breadwinning’, yet 
have economic consequences for the primary caregiver.  This is, of course, currently reflected in the 
non-discrimination principle developed in the divorce context through Lord Nicholls’ analysis in 
White.  This does, to its credit, embody a substantive equality discourse centred on entitlement and 
fairness.  However, it is argued, this must not only be retained in the divorce context in private 
family law, but also expanded to apply on cohabitation breakdown where there is economic 
relationship-generated disadvantage.   
By adopting a positive approach to the value of family solidarity – both breadwinning and caregiving 
– we can hope to get away from the negativity which surrounds the discourses of vulnerability, 
dependence and even relationship-generated disadvantage, all based on the female-centred ethics 
of care discourse.  Solidarity, as a concept, has the virtue of going beyond ethics of care to embrace 
the joint enterprise of family life in all its different forms.  It will be found within relationships of 
same and different-sex couples whether married or unmarried, with or without (step-)children and 
within the post-separation family too.  It can and should therefore be used to positively recast the 
value of the family business of caring and mutual support both within and outside marriage.  
There is a real risk that without more nuanced thinking, the autonomy and formal equality rhetorics 
will reinforce each other and lead family law to ignore the value of care, support and personal 
commitment undertaken within the family to the collective benefit of both family and wider society. 
Such developments should be resisted, not by replacing the liberal legal subject with a vulnerable 
legal subject as suggested by Fineman, but by placing at the heart of family law a modernised 
concept of family solidarity which recognises the positive face of interdependency in the 21st century 
and which embraces the new discourse of joint enterprise through which the family business of 
caring and of love and support are not outshone by the glossy, superficial allure of formal equality 
and autonomy. 
